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Innovation is strongly encouraged by both competition and cooper-
ation among ﬁrmswithmarket power. It should be regarded as a part of
the design of a competition policy. The truth is that research joint ven-
tures (RJVs) used to be taboo in US competition policy until the US gov-
ernment enacted the National Cooperative Research Act (NCRA) in
1984.1 In 1961 the Japanese government enacted the Act on Mining
and Manufacturing Industry Technology Research Association on the
model of the research association system in the UK (see Nakamura
et al. (1997) and Sakakibara and Cho (2002)). This law increased the
number of RJVs formed in Japan. At that time, Japanese ﬁrms had poora Mallick and two anonymous
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. This is an open access article underaccess to resources compared to companies in other economically devel-
oped countries. For that reason, the Japanese government recommended
that ﬁrms form RJVs. As a consequence, the shortage of funds of many
Japanese companies induced a strategic move to RJV. Forming a RJV is
now regarded as a ﬁrm's usual strategy to survive market competition.2
In the competition policies of many developed countries, RJVs are allow-
able subject to a rule of reason rather than being illegal per se.3
In Japan, 20 major ﬁrms involved in petroleum and chemical indus-
tries established the “Research Association of Reﬁnery Integration
for Group-Operation (RING)” in May 2000.4 The main purpose of RING
is to encourage RJV projects for cost-effective plant operation and
emissions' reduction among participants to enhance a competitive ad-
vantage and to survive in the international market. Particularly with re-
spect to RING's ERJV projects, the striking characteristic is that research2 For details of RJV studies, see Katsoutacos and Ulph (1998); Amir (2000a); Cassiman
(2000); Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000); Caloghirou et al. (2003); Leahy and Neary
(2005); Atallah (2007) and Shibata (2014).
3 The rule of reason is a legal doctrine of antitrust law (the Sherman Act). Christiansen
and Kerber (2006, p.217) presented the classic deﬁnition of the rule of reason: “The court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business towhich the restraint is applied;
its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the character of the restraint and
its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the rea-
son for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts” (Chicago Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)). The essence
of the rule of reason is that, in the context of competition policy, it is indispensable to eval-
uate positive effects as well as negative effects produced by ﬁrms' coordination behavior.
The economic evaluation presented in this paper is consistent with this doctrine. For de-
tails of the rule of reason, see Areeda (1986) and Christiansen and Kerber (2006).
4 For details, see RING's website (http://www.ring.or.jp/).
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
Table 1
Four scenarios.
Scenarios R&D stage Production stage (after R&D stage)
Environmental R&D competition (case N) Firms compete. Each ﬁrm decides its own environmental
R&D investment level to maximize its own proﬁt given
R&D investments of the rival.
Firms compete (under emission tax policy). Emissions are
reduced by the ﬁrm's environmental R&D investment and
some spillover effects from rivals' results of R&D activity.
Environmental R&D cartelization (case C) Each ﬁrm coordinates its own environmental R&D
investment level to maximize joint proﬁts.
Firms compete (under emission tax policy). Emissions are
reduced by the ﬁrm's environmental R&D investment and
some spillover effects from rivals' results of R&D activity.
ERJV competition (case NJ) Firms agree to form an ERJV to avoid duplication of R&D
activities. Firms fully share the resulting technologies of
environmental R&D. The degree of technological spillover
is perfect. However, each ﬁrm chooses its own R&D investment
level non-cooperatively to maximize its own proﬁt.
Firms compete (under emission tax policy). Emissions are
reduced by the sum of all environmental R&D efforts in
the industry.
ERJV cartelization (case CJ) Firms agree to form an ERJV to avoid R&D activity duplication.
Firms fully share the resulting environmental R&D technologies.
The degree of technological spillover is perfect. Firms
coordinate their R&D investment levels to maximize joint proﬁts.
Firms compete (under emission tax policy). Emissions are
reduced by the sum of all environmental R&D efforts in
the industry.
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the participating ﬁrms have intentionally avoided a horizontal ERJV to
avoid exposure to prosecution for violation of antitrust laws. Is a hori-
zontal ERJV socially harmful, or beneﬁcial? At least the Japanese
antitrust authorities have not earnestly considered the question. Other
countries might have similar organizations.
In the ﬁeld of economics of environmental regulation, several stud-
ies have been undertaken to reveal better R&D formation to internalize
environmental externalities with a highly advanced emission abate-
ment technology or to improve environmental quality (e.g., Chiou and
Hu (2001); Poyago-Theotoky (2007, 2010); Yakita and Yamauchi
(2011); Kesavayuth and Zikos (2012); Nimubona and Benchekroun
(2015), and Ouchida and Goto (2016)).5 However, clear-cut and com-
prehensive policymaps of socially efﬁcient R&D formations correspond-
ing to various regulatory circumstances are not still provided. With
respect to forming an RJV, Grossman and Shapiro (1986, Section 4)
point out that two conﬂicting effects exists: social beneﬁts and anticom-
petitive dangers. Furthermore, in the ﬁeld of law and policy, it has been
considered that RJV should be evaluated from the perspective of a rule of
reason. Nevertheless, investigations and discussions of RJV for emis-
sions' reduction are utterly inadequate. Unfortunately, evaluation
under a rule of reason lags far behind real-world environmental innova-
tion. Therefore, the question persists: under what circumstances is RJV
in an environmental area socially justiﬁed? This question has not been
answered. This paper presents an examination of the question of
whether environmental research joint venture (ERJV) formation within
a symmetric R&D/Cournot model improves social welfare.
To investigate that question analytically, following the well-known
deﬁnition of R&D scenarios by Kamien et al. (1992, p.1295), we intro-
duce two ERJV formation scenarios into a setting where a regulator
has no precommitment ability for an emission tax (i.e., time-
consistent emission tax) [see Table 16]: ERJV competition and ERJV car-
telization. In the cases of such ERJV formation, both ﬁrmsmust agree to
share environmental R&D ﬁndings completely before the R&D stage.
The difference between ERJV competition and ERJV cartelization lies in
the absence or presence of coordination of each ﬁrm's R&D effort level
in the R&D stage.
From the viewpoint of proﬁt-maximization, ﬁrms choose the most
privately preferable environmental R&D formation among allowable
R&D formations. However, that plan is not always realized because the
actual R&D formation is the product of strategic interactions between5 As some representative studies of environmental R&D from the empirical side, see
Scott (2003, 2005).
6 This table follows Kamien et al. (1992, Table 1).ﬁrms facing government regulations. Then, what is the mechanism of
a ﬁrm's endogenous choice of environmental R&D formation? No stud-
ies have explored this question. For that reason, this paper presents de-
velopment of a new analytical framework. To describe a ﬁrm's
endogenous choice of environmental R&D formation including ERJV for-
mations more precisely, it is necessary to consider the following two
points. One is game timing. The other is the assumption of controllabil-
ity of R&D spillover effects. The ﬁrst is related to the endogenous spill-
over model (Katsoutacos and Ulph (1998); Kultti and Takalo (1998)
and Poyago-Theotoky (1999); Gersbach and Schmutzler (2003); Jin
and Troege (2006) etc.). Kultti and Takalo (1998) and Poyago-
Theotoky (1999) examine the three-stage game that comprises cost-
reducing R&D investment (stage 1), ﬁrms' endogenous choice of R&D
spillover (stage 2), and quantity competition (stage 3). In contrast to
that, the game timing used for the analyses described in this paper dif-
fers from the settings of those previous studies. As described in this
paper, stage 1 and stage 2 are interchanged. More precisely, Kultti and
Takalo (1998) and Poyago-Theotoky (1999) consider ﬁrms' endoge-
nous choices of the degree of R&D spillover after the R&D stage. The
present paper explicitly examines the mechanism of endogenous
R&D formation before the environmental R&D stage. The reason for
the use of our setting is that the ERJV setup must be agreed upon
before the R&D stage. The second point for consideration is related to
the controllability of R&D spillover. Poyago-Theotoky (1999) assumes
that the R&D spillover effect is perfectly controllable for each ﬁrm. How-
ever, judged from a realistic perspective, the assumption of perfect con-
trollability is somewhat strong because some R&D spillover effects
cannot be controlled by ﬁrms. Consequently, in contrast to that study,
the degree of R&D spillover effects is newly deﬁned as partially
controllable.
To examine ﬁrms' endogenous choice of R&D formation andwelfare
performance of the four scenarios deﬁned in Table 1, we compare two
ERJV formations' equilibrium outcomes with the equilibrium outcomes
of environmental R&D competition/cartelization explored by Poyago-
Theotoky (2007). In the Poyago-Theotoky (2007)model, the technolog-
ical spillover effect is invariably given exogenously: ﬁrms cannot control
it. Consequently, this paper extends her model. Precisely speaking, we
include two options of endogenous ERJV formation in which ﬁrms can
set the technological spillover effect at the full level from the initial
given level, but only if both ﬁrms agree on full information sharing of
environmental R&D ﬁndings before the R&D stage.
In the context of policy design in an oligopolistic market, strategic
interactions exist between the government and ﬁrms with market
power. In the absence of a precommitment ability related to the emis-
sion tax rate, ﬁrms' environmental R&D investment can affect future
10 This end-of-pipe technology does not change initial (gross) emissions per unit of out-
put, but it can reduce ﬁnal (net) emissions at the end-of-pipe.
11 This setting differs from existing endogenous spillover models (e.g., Kultti and Takalo
(1998); Poyago-Theotoky (1999), and Jin and Troege (2006)). In a different context from
ours, Poyago-Theotoky (1999) assumes that the degree of spillover is perfectly controlla-
ble for eachﬁrm. However, in our real society, itwould not be an exaggeration to state that
there invariably exist someR&D spillover effects that ﬁrms cannot control. For that reason,
181Y. Ouchida, D. Goto / Economic Modelling 55 (2016) 179–188government decision-making related to emission tax policy.7 Strictly
speaking, polluting ﬁrms can have some incentives for large environ-
mental R&D investment to elicit a lower emission tax rate from the gov-
ernment. The effect is designated as a ratchet effect.8 The problems of
timing and precommitment ability in environmental policy have been
explored widely (Poyago-Theotoky and Teerasuwannajak (2002);
Abrego and Perroni (2002); Requate (2005); Puller (2006), and
Brunner et al. (2012)), but little attention has been devoted to the wel-
fare performance of ERJV in the presence of a ratchet effect. The primary
purpose of this study is to clarify that point, which remains obscure.
Ourmain contributions are the following. First, we demonstrate that
both ﬁrms will invariably form ERJV cartelization within a symmetric
R&D/Cournot model to the extent that the government completely
approves R&D coordination and full information sharing under the
time-consistent emission tax. Neither the ERJV competition nor envi-
ronmental R&D competition/cartelization is formed spontaneously in
this context. Second, althoughwe conﬁrm that thewelfare performance
of ERJV cartelization always dominates ERJV competition and environ-
mental R&D cartelization, we also demonstrate, in sharp contrast to re-
sults of previousworks, that ERJV cartelization is not necessarily socially
preferable or acceptable. The welfare performance of ERJV cartelization
varies with conditions of three exogenous parameters: environmental
damage, cost efﬁciency of R&D investment, and the initial technological
spillover effect.We identify the conditions inwhich environmental R&D
competition is superior to ERJV cartelization. In other words, this article
describes the frontier of policy change between environmental R&D
competition and ERJV cartelization.We present a complete examination
of ﬁrms' endogenous choice of environmental R&D formation under a
time-consistent emission tax and present theoretical foundations for
ERJV policy and ﬁrm behaviors.
This paper is presented as follows. The next section introduces the
model and some preliminary points related to the evaluation of four en-
vironmental R&D formations. The third section is an exploration of the
ﬁrm proﬁtability and endogenous choice of environmental R&D forma-
tion. The fourth section presents an examination of which R&D regime
has social superiority; then it presents a derivation of theoretical contri-
butions and policy implications. The ﬁnal section presents conclusions.
2. The model and some preliminary points
First, Subsection 2.1 presents the model designed to investigate the
welfare performance of four environmental R&D formations deﬁned in
Table 1.9 Second, as some preliminary points related to the derivation
of new ﬁndings, Subsection 2.2 provides equilibrium outcomes under
four scenarios.
2.1. The model
This paper assumes an industry comprising two homogeneous ﬁrms
(ﬁrm i andﬁrm j) engaging in a quantity competitionwith the same cost
structure and emission-reducing technology. Then qi denotes ﬁrm i's7 We assume that the regulator is unable to commit to a ﬁxed emission tax policy
(i.e., no precommitment ability) in this environmental R&D context. A reviewer, however,
pointed out that the assumptionmight seem to be in direct opposition to the idea of bind-
ing international agreements to limit greenhouse gas emissions with some expectation
that those agreements are binding. The reviewer also pointed out this issue can be re-
solved by framing the precommitment issues in terms of the long-run vs. short-run. Policy
is apparently ﬁxed in the short-run, but in the long-run, regulators cannot precommit for
the next round of international negotiations. If the R&D time-horizon is of approximately
the long-run, then the no-precommitment assumption is reasonable. Actually, we
established that each ﬁrm's cost function has no ﬁxed cost. Therefore, implicitly, we as-
sume a long-run situation.
8 For detailed discussions about the ratchet effect, see Hepburn (2006, Section 5); Puller
(2006), and Brunner et al. (2012, Subsubsection 3.1.3).
9 Whereas the currentmodel fundamentally follows the Poyago-Theotoky (2007)mod-
el, the setting of this article includes the Poyago-Theotoky model for subgames. See also
footnote 16.output. Demand is given as p(qi,qj)=a−(qi+qj) , (i, j=1,2; i≠ j),
where a(N0) is a market size parameter.
The value of each ﬁrm's emissions per unit of output is one. Firm i's
environmental R&D effort is captured by zi. Both ﬁrms use end-of-pipe
technology for pollution abatement. This end-of-pipe technology miti-
gates (net) emissions by adsorbing pollution at the end of the produc-
tion process.10 Flue gas desulfurization equipment and activated
carbon adsorption equipment are examples of end-of-pipe technology.
Firm i receives beneﬁts not only from its own environmental R&Def-
fort but also from the effort of its rival. When ﬁrm i's production level is
qi, then the R&D expenditure (γ/2)zi2 ,(γN0) enables ﬁrm i to abate its
emissions from qi to ei(qi,zi)≡qi−zi−βjzj, (i, j=1, 2; i≠ j). A lower
value of γ implies higher efﬁciency of the R&D cost. In ﬁrm i's emission
function ei(qi,zi), positive externalities from ﬁrm j's R&D effort are
captured by βjzj. The R&D spillover effect from ﬁrm j to ﬁrm i is deﬁned
as follows.11
β j ¼ 1 if an ERJV is realized:β ∈ 0;1½ Þ otherwise:

This paper assumes that an ERJV is realized between two ﬁrms only
when both ﬁrms agree to form an ERJV before R&D investment (to
choose its environmental R&D level cooperatively/non-cooperatively)
and execute complete information sharing of R&D results after R&D ac-
tivities. Consequently, in the case of ERJV, the value of the spillover ef-
fect is set endogenously as βi=1=βj by both ﬁrms. The analyses
described in this article are also made under the assumption that no
ﬁxed costs for ERJV are necessary. When ERJV is not realized, both
ﬁrms face an exogenous spillover parameter β∈ [0 ,1) that is assumed
to be symmetric.12 No ﬁxed costs for pollution abatement are
necessary.13 In addition, ﬁrm i's total cost function is additively separa-
ble with respect to production costs and R&D expenditures:C(qi,zi)=
cqi+(γ/2)zi2 ,(cN0,A≡a−cN0).
Firm i's net emissions ei(qi,zi) depend on both the output and envi-
ronmental R&D effort. Total emissions E ≡∑2i¼1eiðqi; ziÞ cause environ-
mental damage D(E)≡(d/2)E2; d Nd ≡ −1þ ﬃﬃﬃ3p =2  is the damage
coefﬁcient.14 Social welfare is deﬁned as the sum of consumers' surplus
and the producers' surplus less environmental damage and total R&D
expenditures.
In this model, the government has policy instruments of two types.
One is competition policy: a combination of ERJV policy and approval/
disapproval of R&D coordination. At the ﬁrst stage, the government de-
cides according to a rule of reasonwhether an ERJV is socially prohibited,
and also whether R&D coordination is socially allowable. The other rolewe assume that βi is partially controllable for ﬁrm i.
12 For details of R&D spillover, see Griliches (1992) and Goel and Haruna (2007,
Section 1). For a model of technological spillovers in the context of international environ-
mental R&D, see El-Sayeda and Rubio (2014).
13 Most existing incumbents in the chemical products industry have installed emission-
reducing equipment of the end-of-pipe type. Such investments in quality-improvement of
desulfurization and hydrodenitrogenation catalysts are applicable to this model because
no ﬁxed set-up cost for abatement is required. In contrast to this model, the installation
of a new abatement technology incurs a ﬁxed set-up cost (see Requate andUnold (2003)).
14 An interior solution for R&D stage is guaranteed by this assumption (see Ouchida and
Goto (2011)). Exogenousparameter d should be derived from theﬁndings of environmen-
tal epidemiology and public health. In fact, population accumulation, depopulation, and
pollutant toxicity can affect d. The value of d∈ðd;þ∞Þwhich describes various market cir-
cumstances can be plausible. Hence, more interdisciplinary studies must be conducted to
produce effective ERJV guidelines. Antelo and Loureiro (2009, p.1432) regard d as “the
regulator's valuation of the environment, or the regulator's preferences with respect to
the redistribution of environmental damage.”
182 Y. Ouchida, D. Goto / Economic Modelling 55 (2016) 179–188is emission tax policy. This study assumes that the government has no
precommitment ability for an emission tax rate t. Consequently, the
tax rate is set to maximize social welfare after ﬁrms' environmental
R&D investment at stage 2.15 The time structure is the following.16
Stage 1: The government decides whether to prohibit an ERJV between
two ﬁrms, or not, and also whether R&D coordination is per-
mitted.
Each ﬁrm's strategy set at the second stage depends on the
government's decision-making at stage 1. All potentialities for a
ﬁrm's strategy set at stage 2 are the following four cases.
[1] When the government prohibits both ERJV and R&D coordina-
tion, each ﬁrm's strategy set at stage 2 is {N}.
[2] When the government allows ERJV, and when it prohibits R&D
coordination, ﬁrms i and j (i≠ j) respectively choose their own
R&D formations si and sj from the strategy set {N,NJ} at stage 2.
[3] When the government prohibits ERJV, andwhen permitting R&D
coordination, ﬁrms i and j (i≠ j) respectively choose their own
R&D formations si and sj from the strategy set {N,C} at stage 2.
[4] When the government allows both of ERJV and R&D coordina-
tion, ﬁrms i and j respectively choose their own R&D formations
si and sj from the strategy set {N,C,NJ,CJ} at stage 2.
Stage 2: From the strategy set corresponding the result of government's
decision-making at stage 1, ﬁrms i and j respectively choose
their own R&D formations si and sj simultaneously. The
resulting R&D formation is generated by the following rules.
When si; s j  ¼ C;Cð Þ; then case C is realized:When si; s j  ¼ NJ;NJð Þ; then case NJ is realized:When si; s j  ¼ CJ;CJð Þ; then case CJ is realized:When si; s j  ¼ N;Nð Þ or si≠s j; then case N is realized:
Stage 3: Each ﬁrm chooses its environmental R&D effort level.
Stage 4: The regulator sets the emission tax rate to maximize social
welfare.
Stage 5: Firm i sets its output level non-cooperatively to maximize its
own proﬁt.
2.2. Equilibrium outcomes
The solution concept used here is the subgame-perfect Nash equilib-
rium (SPNE). The ﬁve-stage game explained above is solved by back-
ward induction. Appendix A presents the examinations of subgames:
stages 3, 4, and 5. A brief sketch of solution procedures under four
scenarios deﬁned in Table 1 and results are provided in Appendix A
and Table A1. Furthermore, we summarize the existence of equilibrium
outcomes under four scenarios as the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.
(i) There exist unique equilibrium outcomes in cases N and C,
respectively.
(ii) If both ﬁrms form an ERJV with full information sharing of R&D re-
sults, which is characterized by endogenous setting βi=1=βj,
then there exist unique equilibrium outcomes in case NJ and CJ,
respectively.15 The choice of timing of the game depends on precommitment ability for the tax rate. If
the regulator has such ability, he can set the tax rate before R&D stage. Ouchida and Goto
(2016) examined cases in which the regulator has precommitment ability. Results show
that environmental R&D cartelization is always sociallymore efﬁcient than environmental
R&D competition. Moreover, ERJV cartelization is socially the most efﬁcient.
16 Whereas stages 3, 4, and 5 in this paper are identical to the three-stage game devel-
oped by Poyago-Theotoky (2007), stages 1 and 2 are newly added for the analyses de-
scribed in this paper.Proof.
(i) See Poyago-Theotoky (2007, Section 2). □
(ii) See Appendix A of this paper and Poyago-Theotoky (2007,
Section 2). The equilibrium outcomes under ERJV competition
(cartelization) are produced from the equilibriumvalues of envi-
ronmental R&D competition (cartelization) case after setting
βi=1=βj. □3. Firm proﬁtability and endogenous choice of R&D formation
We analyze each ﬁrm's choice of environmental R&D formation at
stage 2. In Subsection 2.1, the time structure of the game is explained.
We have understood that, as a result of the government decision-
making during the ﬁrst stage, four potential circumstances exist.
First, if neither ERJV nor R&D coordination is allowed, then the only
lawful R&D formation is R&D competition (case N). Then, each ﬁrm ob-
tains πN. Second, if eachﬁrm faceswith the strategy set {N,NJ}, then they
compare πN with πNJ. We readily obtain that πNJNπN. Third, if each ﬁrm
has the strategy set {N,C}, then they compare πNwith πC.With regard to
private incentives for R&D cooperation, Poyago-Theotoky (2007, p.70)
shows that πCNπN.17
Next, we examine the fourth potentiality. If each ﬁrm faces the strat-
egy set {N,C,NJ,CJ}, then it compares four equilibrium proﬁts: πN, πC, πNJ,
and πCJ. Eq. (16) of Poyago-Theotoky (2007, p.70) straightforwardly
demonstrates that πCJNπNJ when βi=1=βj. That study implies that
ERJV competition (case NJ) is not implemented. Furthermore, πN is
dominated by πC. Consequently, to derive new contributions, we specif-
ically examine πCJ and πC. Comparison of the equilibrium proﬁt under
ERJV cartelization, πCJ, with that under environmental R&D cartelization,
πC shows that πCJNπC for alldNd, γN0 and β∈[0,1). From the discussion
presented above, we have πCJNπCNπN and πCJNπNJNπN for all dNd, γN0
and β∈[0,1). Consequently, these show that ERJV cartelization is most
preferred for each ﬁrm.
Proposition 1 summarizes results related to a ﬁrm's choice of R&D
formation.
Proposition 1.
(i) When both ERJV and R&D coordination are socially prohibited, then
environmental R&D competition is the only feasible formation.
(ii) When ERJV is socially allowable, and when R&D coordination is
socially prohibited, then both ﬁrms prefer ERJV competition to
environmental R&D competition.
(iii) When ERJV is socially prohibited, and when R&D coordination is
socially allowable, then both ﬁrms prefer environmental R&D
cartelization to environmental R&D competition.
(iv) When both ERJV and R&D coordination are socially allowable, then
both ﬁrms prefer ERJV cartelization to any other scenario.
Proof. See S.1 of Supplementary material (Appendix C). □
The investigations explained above demonstrate that ERJV carteliza-
tion between symmetric Cournot duopolists always yields the greatest
proﬁtability among four scenarios. This new result is derived from ex-
aminations under our endogenous choice model of environmental
R&D formation. Therefore, both ﬁrms invariably carry out ERJV carteli-
zation at stage 2 unless it is prohibited. The intuitive explanation here
is given as follows. Forming an ERJV (i.e., βi=1=βj) generates the
strongest free-riding effect.18 Moreover, R&D coordination internalizes17 For the proofs of πNJNπN and πCNπN, see S.1 of Supplementary material.
18 For an explanation of the free-riding effect, see Eq. (A.2). In (A.2), (∂t/∂zi)βzj denotes
the free-riding effect.
22 Critical value γCJt ≡ 4d(3−2d)/(2d2+d−1) is derived from tCJ=0.
23 Our companion paper (Ouchida and Goto (2014)) reveals the emission-reducing ef-
fects of negative emission taxes (i.e., emission subsidies). That study is very closely related
to the investigations conducted by this paper. For details, see Proposition 2 and Fig. 1(iv) in
Ouchida and Goto (2014).
24 The critical value γNt ≡ d(3−2d)(1+β)2/2(2d2+d−1) is derived from tN=0.
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proﬁt from environmental R&D investment.
4. R&D regimes and social superiority
Next we explore the government's decision-making at stage 1.With
respect to the equilibrium social welfare presented in Table A1, from
Poyago-Theotoky's (2007) investigation, it can be understood that
SWCJNSWNJ.19 That is, the equilibrium social welfare under ERJV cartel-
ization dominates that under ERJV competition. Therefore, the govern-
ment has no social incentive for ERVJ competition. Hereinafter, we do
not analyze the case of ERJV competition. Instead, we concentrate on
the welfare performance of the other R&D regimes. This section pre-
sents an examination of whether equilibrium social welfare under
ERJV cartelization dominates that under the other two R&D scenarios:
environmental R&D competition and environmental R&D cartelization.
4.1. Environmental R&D cartelization versus ERJV cartelization
Comparing equilibrium social welfare under environmental R&D
cartelization, SWC, with that under ERJV cartelization, SWCJ, engenders
the following proposition.
Proposition 2. SWCJNSWC for all dNd, γN0 and β∈[0,1).
Proof. See S.2 of Supplementary material (Appendix C). □
This proposition states that, in terms of social-welfaremaximization,
ERJV cartelization invariably dominates the case of environmental R&D
cartelization. Full information sharing generates welfare superiority
compared with the case of R&D cartelization. This result is consistent
with our intuition.
4.2. Environmental R&D competition versus ERJV cartelization
First, as a baseline of our analysis, we can set the curve provided in
Poyago-Theotoky (2007, p71). We designate it as γφ. In the region
above (below) the curve γφ in Fig. 1, SWC≥(b)SWN and zC≥(b)zN.20 In
addition, when the degree of spillover is perfect (i.e., βi=1=βj), then
SWCJNSWNJ.
We now compare the two equilibrium social welfare levels: SWCJ
and SWN. The difference between them is given as shown below.




S.3 of Supplementary material (Appendix C) presents details of
Eq. (1). Fig. 1 presents a graphical analysis of this comparison.
Speciﬁc examination of the case of imperfect spillover (i.e., βi=βj=
βb1) reveals some interesting ﬁndings: When d bd ≤ 3=2 , then
J(d,γ;β)≥0; ERJV cartelization is invariably socially superior to environ-
mental R&D competition, irrespective of the value of γ. However, if dN3/
2, then ERJV cartelization is superior (inferior) to environmental R&D
competition for all γ≥(b)γJV ≡ {γ(N0)| J(d,γ;β)=0,dN3/2}.21 In the re-
gion above (below) the curve γJV in Fig. 1, SWCJ≥(b)SWN. These new
ﬁndings are summarized as Proposition 3.19 See Eq. (14), Corollary 1 and Proof of Proposition 2 in Appendix A in Poyago-Theotoky
(2007). In her analysis, ERJVs are not examined as the central question. Strictly speaking,
she demonstrates that SWC|β=1NSWN|β=1 in the special case in which the value of exog-
enous parameter β is one.
20 The deﬁnition of φ is given by Poyago-Theotoky (2007, p.69). The deﬁnition of γφ is
γφ ≡ {γ N 0|φ ≡ d(3−2d)(1+β)2(1−β)+2γ(2d2β+2dβ−β+d)=0,d N 3/2}. The curve
γφ has the following property: lim
d→þ∞
γφ ¼ ð1þ βÞ2ð1−βÞ=2β . Results show that
when βi=1=βj, then γφ disappears. Her investigation reveals that sign{φ}=
sign{zC−zN}=sign{SWC−SWN}.
21 It is straightforward to verify the existence and uniqueness of γJV. However, it is ex-
tremely difﬁcult to obtain γJV explicitly by solving the cubic equation J(d,γ;β)=0.Proposition 3.
(i) If d b d≤3=2, then SWCJ ≥SWN for all γN0 and β∈[0,1).
(ii) If dN3/2 and γ≥γJV, then SWCJ≥SWN for all β∈[0,1).
(iii) If dN3/2 and γbγJV, then SWCJbSWN for all β∈[0,1).
Poyago-Theotoky (2010) points out that negative emission taxes
(emission subsidies) might be socially justiﬁed. When the value of d is
in the interval ðd;3=2Þ and the value of γ is strictly smaller than the crit-
ical value γCJt ≡4d(3−2d)/(2d2+d−1), then the regulator canmitigate
market inefﬁciency through emission subsidies and ERJV cartelization
irrespective of the value of the spillover parameter.22 In fact, in Region
I below the curve γCJt in Fig. 1, one can observe that tCJb0 and
SWCJNSWCNSWN.23 Propositions 2 and 3 show that, even in the case of
ERJV cartelization, not only its desirability but also a negative emission
tax (emission subsidy) might be socially justiﬁed. However, only
when γbγNt (bγCJt ), then tNb0.24 Therefore, in Region IV below the
curve γJV, the value of tN is always positive. In Fig. 1, Regions II and III re-
spectively denote the region between γCJt and γφ, and the region be-
tween γφ and γJV. Whereas Poyago-Theotoky (2007) shows that γφ
represents the borderline of sign{SWC−SWN}, the existence of γJV,
which plays key roles in Proposition 3, is newly revealed by this re-
search. As Fig. 1 clariﬁes, when βi=1=βj, then Regions III and IV disap-
pear (see S.3 of Supplementary material and footnote 20).
Table 2 presents the welfare ranking and the sign of an emission tax
rate in each region of Fig. 1. Fig. 1 and Table 2 show that, in Regions I, II,
and III, the implementation of ERJV cartelization yields improvement in
social welfare. However, particularly addressing the existence of Region
IV, it seems clear that ERJV cartelization is not necessarily better than in
any other scenario. Particularly with a small value of γ, (γbγJV), and a
large value of d , (dN3/2), environmental R&D competition is socially
better.25 In other words, part (iii) of Proposition 3 shows that ERJV car-
telization is socially harmful in Region IV. Therefore, it is apparent that a
social incentive for ERJV cartelization does not always exist. Further-
more, to reveal the difference of emission reducing effect, we examine
what scenario generates the lowest emissions. By comparing four equi-
librium emissions (eN, eC, eNJ, and eCJ) presented in Table A1, we obtain
that the lowest total emission is yielded under case CJ for all d N d, γN0
and β∈[0,1).
The reason for the existence of Region IV can be interpreted as fol-
lows. Greater R&D efforts decrease the emission tax rate chosen during
the fourth stage.26 In papers by Hepburn (2006); Puller (2006), and
Brunner et al. (2012), this decrease is designated as a “ratchet effect.” If
the value of γ is small, then the joint-proﬁt maximization effect is dom-
inated by the proﬁt-enhancing effect through the ratchet effect. For that
reason, there can exist circumstances such that zCJbzN.27 Greater envi-
ronmental R&D efforts increase production levels and consumer sur-
plus. When the damage is severe and when R&D costs are highly25 The critical value of theparameter capturing theR&Defﬁciency,γJV, can be interpreted
as the threshold that indicates for the regulator the environmental R&D formation to ap-
prove when the damage is severe.
26 See Eq. (A.1) in Appendix A. In fact, one obtains that ∂t(zi,zj)/∂zib0.
27 Appendix B proves the mechanism of zCJ b zN through comparison of the proﬁt
enhancing effect and the joint proﬁt maximization effect. In fact, a comparison between
zCJ and zN yields the following result: zCJ≥(b)zN for all γ≥ðbÞγ^Ν ≡ dð1−βÞδ=μ , where
μ≡(1+d)2[2d2+(4−β)d−1](N0) and δ≡18d3+41d2+12d−15+β(d+3)(d2+
3d−1)(N0). Therefore, ifγ is small (γ b γ^N), then zCJ b zN. This result differs from the result
reported by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990), which showed that cost-reducing
R&D efforts under RJV cartelization are invariably greater than under any other scenario.
This result implies that the case of ERJV cartelization does not always yield larger invest-
ments than under any other scenario presented in Table 1.
Fig. 1. Environmental R&D competition versus ERJV cartelization.
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duce large increase effects on consumer surplus and a large mitigating
effect on environmental damage. These effects dominate the increasing
effects of R&D costs. Therefore, the equilibrium social welfare under en-
vironmental R&D competition is greater than in the case of ERJV cartel-
ization. However, when the damage coefﬁcient is small (db3/2), the
equilibrium social welfare under environmental R&D competition isdominated by that under ERJV cartelization because of the slight miti-
gating effect of environmental damage.
4.3. Theoretical contributions
This article presents development of an analytical framework of en-
dogenous choice of environmental R&D formation. The game-theoretic
Table 2
Welfare ranking and the sign of the emission tax rate.
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four scenarios (in Table 1). Under the settings, two theoretical ﬁndings
are obtained.
The ﬁrst ﬁnding is that each ﬁrm invariably has a private incentive
for ERJV cartelization (Proposition 1(iv)). The second ﬁnding is that
ERJV cartelization does not necessarily engender social efﬁciency
(Propositions 2 and 3). More precisely, in Regions I, II, and III in Fig. 1,
ERJV cartelization is socially beneﬁcial and feasible. However, in Region
IV, ﬁrms cannot receive both proﬁts under ERJV competition/carteliza-
tion (πNJ and πCJ) because thewelfare-maximizing regulator can accom-
modate neither information sharing nor R&D coordination, whereas
ﬁrms prefer ERJV cartelization.
These ﬁndings justify that the stages of government's competition
policy and ﬁrm's endogenous choice of R&D formation are necessary.
In other words, the indispensability of examinations of stages 1 and 2
in the present model is proved by the results of Propositions 2 and 3.
In the previous studies, neither stage has been analyzed explicitly
despite the existence of ﬁrms' private incentives for ERJV cartelization.
Instead, this article presents development of the ﬁve-stage game by
adding stages of a government's competition policy (stage 1) and
ﬁrms' endogenous choices of R&D formation (stage 2) to the Poyago-
Theotoky three-stage model, and also provides complete examinations.
To enrich the theoretical argument in relation to competition policy
in the environmental innovation area, it is important to compare our re-
sult with those of reports of the cost-reducing R&D literature that do not
incorporate ﬁxed cost for RJV. Thewelfare ranking in Region IV is incon-
sistent with ﬁndings reported by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988,
1990); Atallah (2005a) and Lambertini and Rossini (2009) and others,
who show the social superiority of RJV cartelization.28 The result of
Proposition 3(iii) differs greatly from the results presented in a typical
textbook (Belleﬂamme and Peitz (2010, pp. 498–499)), demonstrating
that RJV cartelization yields socially superior performance to that ob-
tained through non-cooperative R&D. Moreover, from the perspective
of RJV cost, Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000) show that R&D competition
can generate higher social welfare than RJV cartelization can, but only
when the cost for forming RJV is sufﬁciently high.29 In sharp contrast to
their study, Proposition 3(iii) of this paper reveals that environmental
R&D competition can yield greater socialwelfare than ERJV cartelization
can even though the assumption of ERJV costs is unnecessary.28 Atallah (2005a, p.933) examines the case of asymmetric spillover. His analysis in-
cludes results of the case of symmetric perfect spillover. Therefore, it is easy to ascertain
the social superiority of RJV cartelization under symmetric perfect spillover. In addition,
for details of the well-known R&D models by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988, 1990)
and Kamien et al. (1992), see reports by Amir (2000b) and Amir et al. (2003). Further-
more, in the literature related to cost-reducing innovation, some studies reveal that
industry-wide RJV cartelization is not necessarily socially preferred. As examples, see Yin
(1999); Amir (2000a), and Yun et al. (2000). Themodels constructed in those studies dif-
fer from the model presented here.
29 Most reports of the cost-reducing R&D literature have examined models without a
ﬁxed cost for RJV. However, studies by Vilasuso and Frascatore (2000); Lambertini et al.
(2002), and Falvey et al. (2013) are exceptional. Particularly Vilasuso and Frascatore
(2000) built the ﬁrst model incorporating an exogenous ﬁxed cost for forming a RJV. Both
models built by Lambertini et al. (2002) and Falvey et al. (2013) are starkly different from
our model.4.4. Policy implications
This paper presents the possibility of the superiority of ERJV carteli-
zation. In Regions I, II, and III shown in Fig. 1, no intervention for ERJV
cartelization is necessary. However, in stark contrast to the well-
known result of cost-reducing R&D, we infer that environmental R&D
competition is socially preferred when pollution abatement is highly
cost-efﬁcient (γbγJV), and also when environmental damage is severe
(dN3/2). In Region IV in Fig. 1, the government should allow neither in-
formation sharing nor R&D coordination.
The category of pollution abatement technology in this model is
called “end-of-pipe.” Measures of this category achieve reduction of
the amount of emissions by absorption at the end of production pro-
cesses. Flue gas desulfurization equipment and activated carbon adsorp-
tion equipment are examples of this type. As an example of the
oligopolistic market corresponding to this model, we can mention oil
reﬁning ﬁrms and ﬁrms with huge chemical plants. In fact, such oligop-
olistic ﬁrms use end-of-pipe technology and also invest in R&D for qual-
ity improvement of catalysts. The results presented in this paper
provide important and indispensable policy implications related to
whether ERJV cartelization in a horizontal relation is socially beneﬁcial.5. Concluding remarks
This paper presents a new analytical framework of environmental
R&D formation. In contrast to reports of the related literature, each
ﬁrm chooses the environmental R&D formation endogenously before
the R&D investment stage. Furthermore, in our ﬁve-stage game, an
ERJV is realized only when two ﬁrms agree to form an ERJV before
R&D investment, and agree to execute complete information sharing
of R&D results after R&D investment. Under the setup and time-
consistent emission taxation, this paper presents evaluation of the wel-
fare performance of four environmental R&D formations and examines
the government's competition policy.
Our analysis obtains the following facts and policy implications. If
environmental damage is severe, and if the parameter of environmental
R&D cost is sufﬁciently small, then environmental R&D competition is
socially preferred. It is particularly interesting that our analysis reveals
the social superiority of environmental R&D competition, although
that scenario is the case of “NO information sharing and NO R&D coordi-
nation.” Under such circumstances, the antitrust authorities should
disallow not only ERJV cartelization but also environmental R&D
cartelization. This result is fairly counterintuitive and differs from the
well-known conclusions reported in the existing literature. However,
if environmental damage is slight, or if severe damage and high inefﬁ-
ciency of environmental R&D costs exist, then ERJV cartelization is so-
cially preferred. Under those circumstances, ﬁrms should be allowed
to form an ERJV cartelization. Such cooperative behavior yields im-
proved social welfare. Furthermore, each ﬁrm invariably has a private
incentive for ERJV cartelization. Our results can considerably enrich
future RJV studies in environmental areas, although only a few ERJV
studies have been made heretofore.
During the last two decades, although the importance of environ-
mental R&D has been increasingly socially recognized, a few studies
have examined the welfare performance of ERJV.30 To design appropri-
ate environmental R&D policy, detailed and practical policy suggestions
on ERJV are desired by policymakers of many countries. As an example,
the Japanese antitrust guidelines for RJV (Japan Fair Trade Commission
[JFTC] (1993) and its amended versions) are ambiguous and frail. Unfor-
tunately, Japanese antitrust authorities (JFTC) have formed detailed
policy guidelines for ERJV only to a slight degree. This fact signiﬁes
that the Japanese antitrust authorities' discretionary power on ERJV is
too strong. Under such regulatory circumstances, ERJV participants30 For example, see Katsoulacos et al. (2001).
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tratively sanctioned) ﬁrm involuntarily because the rules are not
enacted deﬁnitely. In addition, the lack of detailed rules might generate
a disincentive to forming an ERJV. This research provides theoretical
ﬁndings to improve such shortcomings of present systems.
Some directions for future research seem promising. First, the case
of an asymmetric spillover parameter must be analyzed in line
with Atallah's (2005a, 2005b, 2007) examinations. Second, it is neces-
sary to explore the case of a Cournot oligopoly market with socially
responsible ﬁrm (see Lambertini and Tampieri (2015)). Third, some ex-
amination of a time-consistent emission tax policy should be conducted
in a setting where abatement goods and services are provided by an
eco-industry (see David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2010) and David et al.
(2011)).
Appendix A
This Appendix provides a brief outline of solution procedures for
seeking SPNE under the four scenarios deﬁned in Table 1 and equilibri-
um outcomes (Table A1).
A.1. Environmental R&D competition
In this case, neither ﬁrm forms an ERJV or coordinates the R&D effort
level. In the last stage, ﬁrm i's proﬁt is
πi qi; qj
 




− γ=2ð Þz2i :
Each ﬁrm decides its own output level non-cooperatively and simul-
taneously. From the ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization, the
symmetric equilibrium output is derived as q(t)=(A−t)/3.
Consequently, social welfare in stage 4 is calculated as




The regulator sets the emission tax rate tomaximize socialwelfare.31
From the ﬁrst-order condition for social welfare maximization, the
subgame equilibrium tax rate is obtained as
t zi; z j
  ¼ 2d−1ð ÞA−3d 1þ βð Þ zi þ z j
 	
2 1þ dð Þ : ðA:1Þ31 In the case of precommitment to an emission tax rate, emissions' taxation (in general)
induces pollution abatement via an (1) output effect and a (2) substitution effect. The out-
put effect arises as the tax raises the (relative) price of the dirty good, leading to a lower
quantity demanded by consumers. The substitution effect induces the dirty good producer
to lower net emissions to maximize proﬁt. Consequently, the ﬁrms are engaging in envi-
ronmental R&D in an effort to satisfy this substitution effect and to lower net emissions.
In our time-consistent emission tax model, neither ﬁrm knows the emission tax rate be-
fore the environmental R&D stage because the tax rate is not precommitted. However, be-
fore the R&D stage, each ﬁrm knows that the government introduces emissions' taxation.
Consequently, emission abatement is conducted through the output effect and substitu-
tion effect in a time-consistent emission tax model as well as the precommitted emission
tax model.Therefore, ﬁrm i's proﬁt during the third stage is
πi zi; z j
  ¼ q t zi; zj  
 2 þ t zi; z j  zi þ βz j 	− γ=2ð Þz2i :
Each ﬁrm non-cooperatively and simultaneously sets its environ-
mental R&D effort. The ﬁrst-order conditions for proﬁt maximization is














βz j þ t zi; z j
 
−γzi ¼ 0: ðA:2Þ
Therein, i , j=1,2; i≠ j. These conditions generate the following
equilibrium R&D efforts.32
zN ¼ 1þ dð Þ 2d−1ð Þ þ d 1þ βð Þ½ A
2γ 1þ dð Þ2 þ d 1þ βð Þ 3 3þ βð Þ þ d 7þ βð Þ½ 
:
The equilibrium levels of the emission tax rate, output level for each
ﬁrm, proﬁt, and social welfare are presented in Table A1.
A.2. Environmental R&D cartelization
Solution procedures of stages 4 and 5 are identical to those in
Subsubection 2.2.1. However, environmental R&D cartelization implies
that two ﬁrms do not form an ERJV, but they cooperatively and simulta-
neously set their environmental R&D efforts to maximize joint proﬁts
Π≡πi(zi,zj)+πj(zi,zj) during the third stage.33 Then, the equilibrium
levels of the equilibrium outcomes are derived in Table A1.
A.3. ERJV competition
In this case, both ﬁrms form an ERJV to avoid duplication of R&D ac-
tivities and share all R&D information, but they do not coordinate the
R&D effort level. When the ERJV is formed, each ﬁrm chooses perfect
technological spillover. Full sharing of the results of R&D are character-
ized by βi=1=βj, although the value of β is exogenous in the previous
two cases. The equilibrium outcomes under ERJV competition are pro-
duced from the equilibrium values of environmental R&D competition
case after setting βi=1=βj. The results are presented in Table A1.
A.4. ERJV cartelization
In this case, both ﬁrms form an ERJV to avoid duplication of R&D
activities. During the third stage, they coordinate the R&D effort
level to maximize joint proﬁts: Π(zi,zj;βi=1=βj)≡πi(zi,zj;βi=
1)+πj(zi,zj;βj=1). In addition, sharing of the results of R&D is fully
conducted. As in the case of ERJV competition, two ﬁrms set βi=1=
βj. The equilibrium outcomes under ERJV cartelization are derived
from the equilibrium values of environmental R&D cartelization case
after setting βi=1=βj. Results are calculated in Table A1.32 Under case N, we obtain (∂2πi/∂zi2)(∂2πj/∂zj2)−(∂2πi/∂zi∂zj)(∂2πj/∂zj∂zi)= I1/
(4(1+d)2)N0, where I1≡3(1−β)(1+β)2d2(1+d)[9+7d+β(3+d)]+4(1+
β)d[6+(5−β)d]γ+4(1+d)2γ2N0 for all dNd;γ N0 and β∈ [0,1). Therefore, the
Routh–Hurwitz condition for local stability is invariably satisﬁed.
33 Under case C, we have (∂2Π/∂zi2)(∂2Π/∂zj2)−(∂2Π/∂zi∂zj)(∂2Π/∂zj∂zi)= I2/
(3(1+d)4)N0, where I2≡ (1+β)4d3(6+5d)+2(1+β)2d(1+d)2(9+8d)γ+3(1+
d)4γ2N0 for all dNd, γN0 and β∈ [0, 1). Therefore, the Routh–Hurwitz condition
for local stability is invariably satisﬁed.
Table A1
Equilibrium outcomes under four scenarios.
Environmental R&D competition (case N) Environmental R&D cartelization (case C)









Output level qN ¼ ½2ð1þdÞγþdð1þβÞð7þ4dþ3βÞA4γð1þdÞ2þ2dð1þβÞ½3ð3þβÞþdð7þβÞ qC ¼
½dð5þ2dÞð1þβÞ2þγð1þdÞA
2γð1þdÞ2þ4dð3þ2dÞð1þβÞ2
Emission eN ¼ ½2ð1þdÞγþð1þβÞfð3þβÞdþ2gA4γð1þdÞ2þ2dð1þβÞ½3ð3þβÞþdð7þβÞ eC ¼ ½ð1þdÞγþð2dþ1Þð1þβÞ
2 A
2γð1þdÞ2þ4dð3þ2dÞð1þβÞ2
Proﬁts πN=qN2 +tN(1+β)zN−(γ/2)zN2 πC=qC2+ tC(1+β)zC−(γ/2)zC2
Social welfare SWN=2AqN−2qN2−2d{qN−(1+β)zN}2−γzN2 SWC=2AqC−2qC2−2d{qC−(1+β)zC}2−γzC2













Output level qNJ ¼ ½ð1þdÞγþ2dð5þ2dÞA2γð1þdÞ2þ8dð3þ2dÞ qCJ ¼
½4dð5þ2dÞþγð1þdÞA
2γð1þdÞ2þ16dð3þ2dÞ
Emission eNJ ¼ ½ð1þdÞγþ2ð2dþ1ÞA2γð1þdÞ2þ8dð3þ2dÞ eCJ ¼
½ð1þdÞγþ4ð2dþ1ÞA
2γð1þdÞ2þ16dð3þ2dÞ
Proﬁts πNJ=qNJ2 +2tNJzNJ−(γ/2)zNJ2 πCJ=qCJ2 +2tCJzCJ−(γ/2)zCJ2
Social welfare SWNJ=2AqNJ−2qNJ2 −2d{qNJ−2zNJ}2−γzNJ2 SWCJ=2AqCJ−2qCJ2 −2d{qCJ−2zCJ}2−γzCJ2
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We investigate the mechanism underlying Proposition 3. In the last
paragraph of Subsection 4.2, we stated that the result of Proposition
3(iii) is generated by circumstances such that zCJbzN. Under case CJ,
two ﬁrms coordinate the R&D effort levels to maximize joint proﬁts:
Π(zi,zj;βi=1=βj)≡πi(zi,zj;βi=1)+πj(zi,zj;βj=1). Then the ﬁrst-
order condition at the R&D stage is derived as shown below.
∂Π zi; z j;βi ¼ 1 ¼ β j
 
∂zi
¼ ∂πi zi; z j;βi ¼ 1
 
∂zi|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
profit enhancing effectð Þ
þ ∂π j zi; z j;β j ¼ 1
 
∂zi|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
joint profit maximization effectð Þ
¼ 0:
ðB:1Þ
The partial derivative ofΠ(zi,zj;βi=1=βj) comprises the proﬁt en-
hancing effect and the joint proﬁt maximization effect. The ﬁrst-order
condition (B.1) above requires that the summation of two effects is
equal to zero.
When ∂Π(zi,zj;βi=1=βj)/∂zi is evaluated at (zi,zj)=(zN,zN), the
result is obtained as shown below.
∂Π zi; zj;βi ¼ 1 ¼ β j
 
∂zi
 zi ¼ zN
zj ¼ zN
¼ ∂πi zi; z j;βi ¼ 1
 
∂zi
 zi ¼ zN
z j ¼ zN|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼ 0
þ ∂π j zi; zj;β j ¼ 1
 
∂zi
 zi ¼ zN
z j ¼ zN
¼ ∂π j zi; zj;β j ¼ 1
 
∂zi
 zi ¼ zN
zj ¼ zN
⋛ 0:
ðB:2ÞFrom (B.2), we understand that zCJbzN if the proﬁt-enhancement ef-
fect is dominated by the joint maximization effect (if γ b γ^N (see foot-
note 27)). However, zCJNzN if the proﬁt enhancing effect dominates
the joint maximization effect.
Appendix C. Supplementary material
Supplementary material to this article can be found online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2016.01.025.
References
Abrego, L., Perroni, C., 2002. Investment subsidies and time-consistent environmental
policy. Oxf. Econ. Pap. 54 (4), 617–635.
Amir, R., 2000a. R&D returns, market structure, and research joint ventures. J. Inst. Theor.
Econ. 156, 583–598.
Amir, R., 2000b. Modelling imperfectly appropriable R&D via spillovers. Int. J. Ind. Organ.
18 (7), 1013–1032.
Amir, R., Evstigneev, I., Wooders, J., 2003. Non-cooperative versus cooperative R&D with
endogenous spillover rates. Games Econ. Behav. 42 (2), 183–207.
Antelo, M., Loureiro, M.L., 2009. Asymmetric information, signaling and environmental
taxes in oligopoly. Ecol. Econ. 68 (5), 1430–1440.
Areeda, P., 1986. The rule of reason — a catechism on competition. Antitrust Law J. 55
(3/4), 571–589.
Atallah, G., 2005a. R&D cooperation with asymmetric spillovers. Can. J. Econ. 38 (3),
919–936.
Atallah, G., 2005b. Research joint ventures cartelization with asymmetric R&D spillovers.
Econ. Bull. 12 (18), 1–11.
Atallah, G., 2007. Research joint ventures with asymmetric spillovers and symmetric
contributions. Econ. Innov. New Technol. 16, 559–586.
Belleﬂamme, P., Peitz, M., 2010. Industrial Organization: Markets and Strategies.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Brunner, S., Flachsland, C., Marschinski, R., 2012. Credible commitment in carbon policy.
Clim. Pol. 12 (2), 255–271.
Caloghirou, Y., Ioannides, S., Vonortas, N.S., 2003. Research joint ventures. J. Econ. Surv. 14
(4), 541–570.
Caloghirou, Y., Vonortas, N.S., Ioannides, S., 2004. European Collaboration in Research and
Development: Business Strategy and Public Policy. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK.
Cassiman, B., 2000. Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric
information. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 18, 283–314.
Chiou, J.R., Hu, J.L., 2001. Environmental research joint ventures under emission taxes.
Environ. Resour. Econ. 20, 129–146.
Christiansen, A., Kerber, W., 2006. Competition policy with optimally differentiated rules
instead of “per se rule vs rule of reason. J. Compet. Law Econ. 2 (2), 215–244.
188 Y. Ouchida, D. Goto / Economic Modelling 55 (2016) 179–188d'Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A., 1988. Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in a duopoly
with spillovers. Am. Econ. Rev. 78, 1133–1137.
d'Aspremont, C., Jacquemin, A., 1990. Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D in a duopoly
with spillovers: erratum. Am. Econ. Rev. 80, 641–642.
David, M., Sinclair-Desgagné, B., 2010. Pollution abatement subsidies and the eco-
industry. Environ. Resour. Econ. 45, 271–282.
David, M., Nimubona, A.D., Sinclair-Desgagné, B., 2011. Emission taxes and the market for
abatement goods and services. Resour. Energy Econ. 33 (1), 179–191.
El-Sayeda, A., Rubio, S.J., 2014. Sharing R&D investments in cleaner technologies to
mitigate climate change. Resour. Energy Econ. 38, 168–180.
Falvey, R., Poyago-Theotoky, J., Teerasuwannajak, K., 2013. Coordination costs and
research joint ventures. Econ. Model. 33, 965–976.
Gersbach, H., Schmutzler, A., 2003. Endogenous spillovers and incentive to innovate.
Economic Theory 21, 59–79.
Goel, R.K., Haruna, S., 2007. Cooperative and noncooperative R&Dwith spillovers: the case
of labor-managed ﬁrms. Econ. Syst. 31 (4), 423–440.
Griliches, Z., 1992. The search for R&D spillovers. Scand. J. Econ. 94 (Supplement), 29–47.
Grossman, G., Shapiro, C., 1986. Research joint ventures: an antitrust analysis. J. Law Econ.
Org. 2 (2), 315–337.
Hepburn, C., 2006. Regulation by prices, quantities, or both: a review of instrument
choice. Oxf. Rev. Econ. Policy 22 (2), 226–247.
Japan Fair Trade Commission [JFTC], 1993. Guidelines related to joint research and devel-
opment under the antimonopoly act. URL http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/
ama/jointresearch.pdf.
Jin, J.Y., Troege,M., 2006. R&D competition and endogenous spillovers. Manch. Sch. 74 (1),
40–51.
Kamien, M.I., Muller, E., Zang, I., 1992. Research joint ventures and R&D cartels. Am. Econ.
Rev. 87, 642–667.
Katsoulacos, Y., Ulph, A., Ulph, D., 2001. The effects of environmental policy on the perfor-
mance of environmental research joint ventures. In: Carraro, C., GE, Metcalf (Eds.),
Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy. University of Chicago
Press, pp. 309–346 (Chapter 10).
Katsoutacos, Y., Ulph, D., 1998. Endogenous spillovers and the performance of research
joint ventures. J. Ind. Econ. 46, 333–357.
Kesavayuth, D., Zikos, V., 2012. Upstream and downstream horizontal R&D networks.
Econ. Model. 29 (3), 742–750.
Kultti, K., Takalo, T., 1998. R&D spillovers and information exchange. Econ. Lett. 61,
121–123.
Lambertini, L., Rossini, G., 2009. The gains from cooperative R&D with a concave technol-
ogy and spillovers. Int. Game Theory Rev. 11 (1), 77–85.
Lambertini, L., Tampieri, A., 2015. Incentives, performance and desirability of socially re-
sponsible ﬁrms in a Cournot oligopoly. Econ. Model. 50, 40–48.
Lambertini, L., Poddar, S., Sasaki, D., 2002. Research joint ventures, product differentiation,
and price collusion. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 20 (6), 829–854.
Leahy, D., Neary, J.P., 2005. Symmetric research joint ventures: cooperative substitutes
and complements. Int. J. Ind. Organ. 23 (5/6), 381–397.Motta, M., 2004. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, UK.
Nakamura, M., Vertinsky, I., Zietsma, C., 1997. Does culture matter in inter-ﬁrm coopera-
tion? Research consortia in Japan and the USA. Manag. Decis. Econ. 18, 153–175.
Nimubona, A.D., Benchekroun, H., 2015. Environmental R&D in the presence of an eco-
industry. Environ. Model. Assess. 20 (5), 491–507.
Ouchida, Y., Goto, D., 2011. A note on environmental R&D under time-consistent emission
tax. Int. J. Bus. Econ. 10 (3), 257–260.
Ouchida, Y., Goto, D., 2014. Do emission subsidies reduce emission? In the context of en-
vironmental R&D organization. Econ. Model. 36, 511–516.
Ouchida, Y., Goto, D., 2016. Cournot duopoly and environmental R&D under regulator's
precommitment to an emissions tax. Appl. Econ. Lett. 23 (5), 324–331.
Poyago-Theotoky, J., 1999. A note on endogenous spillovers in a non-tournament R&D
duopoly. Rev. Ind. Organ. 15, 253–262.
Poyago-Theotoky, J., 2007. The organization of R&D and environmental policy. J. Econ.
Behav. Organ. 62 (1), 63–75.
Poyago-Theotoky, J., 2010. Corrigendum to “The organization of R&D and environmental
policy” [J. Econ. Behav. Org. 62: 63–75]. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 76, 449.
Poyago-Theotoky, J., Teerasuwannajak, K., 2002. The timing of environmental policy: a
note on the role of product differentiation. J. Regul. Econ. 21 (3), 305–316.
Puller, S., 2006. The strategic use of innovation to inﬂuence regulatory standard.
J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 52, 690–706.
Requate, T., 2005. Dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments — a survey.
Ecol. Econ. 54, 175–195.
Requate, T., Unold, W., 2003. Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced
abatement technology: will the true ranking please stand up? Eur. Econ. Rev. 47,
125–146.
Sakakibara, M., Cho, D.S., 2002. Cooperative R&D in Japan and Korea: a comparison of
industrial policy. Res. Policy 31, 673–692.
Scott, J.T., 2003. Environmental Research and Development: US Industrial Research, the
Clean Air Act and Environmental Damage. Edward Elgar Publishing, Northampton,
MA, USA.
Scott, J.T., 2005. Corporate social responsibility and environmental research and develop-
ment. Struct. Chang. Econ. Dyn. 16, 313–331.
Shibata, T., 2014. Market structure and R&D investment spillovers. Econ. Model. 43,
321–329.
Vilasuso, J., Frascatore, M.R., 2000. Public policy and R&Dwhen research joint ventures are
costly. Can. J. Econ. 33 (3), 818–839.
Yakita, A., Yamauchi, H., 2011. Environmental awareness and environmental R&D spill-
overs in differentiated duopoly. Res. Econ. 65, 137–143.
Yin, X., 1999. Asymmetric research joint ventures and market concentration. Jpn. Econ.
Rev. 50 (3), 309–320.
Yun, K.L., Park, Y.S., Ahn, B.H., 2000. Spillover, competition and better R&D organization.
Jpn. Econ. Rev. 51 (3), 448–461.
